to make a few preliminary comments, by way of orientation. In the first place, the notion of "simplicity," unlike the notion of "analyzability," seems to be psychological rather than logical. Empirical studies by no means indicate universal agreement on what characters in experience are "simple." And yet, no criterion has been presented for simplicity (in the relevant sense) other than what people feel. However, the argument given above does not really depend on the simplicity of red and green, but merely on their unanalyzability; that is, on the fact that "red" and "green" do not possess any synonyms in English or in any other language, actual or merely possible, relevant to this problem (i.e., any synonyms whose substitution for "red" and "green" in (i) would transform it into a theorem of formal logic). This is established, of course, by reflecting on the sense of "red" and "green" and by "seeing" that any definitions that would make "red" and "green" logically dependent (by making "red" and "green" synonymous with some logically dependent expressions P and Q) would involve a violation of the intended meaning of these terms.
Thus, to refute this argument, it is necessary to find expressions P and Q which are synonymous with "red" and "green" respectively, and whose substitution for "red" and "green" in (i) turns it into a theorem of logic,-but we must be sure that P is really synonymous with "red" in the intended sense, and likewise, "green" with Q. In short, we must show that the concepts of red and green involved really are analyzable; the question of simplicity we can drop as irrelevant.
A second remark: The assertion that the concepts red and green are "simple and unanalyzable" may sound very plausible when considered in isolation; but it becomes very paradoxical when we extend the field under consideration. Thus, if "red" and "green" are unanalyzable-what about "colored"? In some ways the notion of being colored seems to me simpler than the notion of being red. Thus it would strike me as very implausible if someone should argue that "colored" is merely short for "red or green or yellow or . Yet the thesis that the relational term "indistinguishable in color from" is analyzable by means of (a finite number of) such nonrelational terms as "red" and "colored" is very dubious. The point I am leading up to by way of all this is very simple: the color properties are not, after all, isolated; they form a system (or better, a continuum). It is not merely that there are reds and greens; there is the underlying property of being colored, of which red and green are specifications; and there are the varying relations of adjacency in this continuum. If any of the dependencies among the color properties and relations are synthetic a priori, then they all may well be: but this seems difficult to believe.
Turning now to the actual reply: I should like to begin by producing for consideration the sentence: (g) "If A is not exactly the same color as B, then if something is the same color as A, then it is not exactly the same color as B." I think there would be general agreement that (g) feels analytic; unlike (I). But at this point our "feelings" about these matters begin to conflict. For, suppose (9) .) The third of these expressions is derivable from the first two quite easily, if one assumes that "Ex" is reflexive, and the second from the first and third. Thus the equivalence of (io) and (i i) is indeed a consequence of (g)-and if (g) is analytic, then (io) and (i i) are simply equivalent, i.e., each is a consequence of the other. Thus the apparently "universally valid" statement (io) is merely a disguised report about A and B.
Of course there is a question as to the analyticity of (9). But I don't think that anyone will maintain that being exactly the same color as is "simple and unanalyzable." In fact it is not even ostensively definable.
If we reflect on the relation "exactly the same color as" we find, in fact, that it is peculiarly difficult to pin down. It appears to have a close connection with the relation of indistinguishability in color from, which is the relation that one would communicate if one tried to give the meaning of "exactly the same color as" by pointing out examples. It is, however, distinct from this relation, since it is clearly transitive (which is all that (g) says) whereas "indistinguishable in color from" is nontransitive, since we could find a chain a,, a2, . . ., a10, let us say, such that a1 is indistinguishable in color from a2, a2 is in turn indistinguishable in color from a3, . . ., a9 is indistinguishable in color from a10; and yet a, is distinguishable in color from a10.
We will avoid for the moment the problem of defining "exactly the same color as"; let us try instead to put down all of its intuitive properties (which can later serve as criteria of adequacy for any definition). Only two properties appear clear to me:
I. "Ex" is an equivalence relation, i.e., it is transitive, reflexive, and symmetrical. II. "Ex" is stronger than "indistinguishable from," i.e., if Ex(x,y), then x is indistinguishable in color from y. which formally expresses the transitivity of "Ex." But more than this. It will follow now, not merely that (io) is equivalent to "A is not exactly the same color as B," but, by virtue of II, that this latter assertion is implied by "A is distinguishable in color from B";-and this, of course, is a mere observation report.
In short, the report proposition that A is distinguishable in color from B is stronger than the statement that A is not exactly the same color as B; and this latter statement is strictly equivalent to the "universal" judgment that nothing is the same color as A and the same color as B (all over) at the same time. Or again, if I point to A and to B (let us suppose for the moment that A is red, and B green) and say "Nothing is the same color as A and the same color as B at the same time,"-this "apodictic" judgment is not a discovery of an "incompatibility" between the colors exemplified by A and B: it is a mere fragment of a report; it says less, logically speaking, than the straightforward report "A is distinguishable in color from B." This, I think, is all that there is to the "factual certainty" of (io). The sentence (io) implies the sentence "A is not exactly the same color as B"; in this sense it "contains" it, as a factual (and even a corrigible) element. But, except for this apparently trivial presupposition, (io) appears to be (a) universal, and (b) certain. The foregoing analysis is designed to show that the certainty and universality of (io) (relative to this assumption) is analytic. In a similar way, one could show that "Nothing is the color that A appears to be and the color that B appears to be (all over) at the same time"-which could have been considered instead of (io)-is equivalent to "A does not appear to be the same color as B." The problem is, how to apply our analysis of (io) to sentence (i).
Suppose a speaker has in mind by "red" any shade of red whatsoever, and by "green" any shade of green whatsoever. Then he must be able to imagine at least two objects, A and B, such that (i) he would apply the term "red" (in that sense) to A and the term "green" (in that sense) to B; and (2) A and B are distinguishable in color. Please note: I have not said that "he must never apply 'red' and 'green' (in whichever sense) to the same object." What I have said is that he mast be able to imagine at least one object which is red but not green, and at least one object which is green but not red. Otherwise, he would simply be using the words "red" and "green" as synonyms (and this particular misuse would, of course, be easily detected). What this amounts to, of course, is that by "that shade of red" and "that shade of green" anyone speaking standard English must mean "exactly the same color as A" and "exactly the same color as B" where A and B must be so chosen or imagined as to be distinguishable in color. But if "that shade of red" and "that shade of green" are always the colors of objects which are distinguishable in color, then it is not a cause for wonder that "Nothing is that shade of red all over and also that shade of green all over at the same time" is always true, no matter who asserts it. And if it is true that no matter which shade of red and which shade of green we choose, nothing is both that shade of red and that shade of green, then it is true that "Nothing is both red and green" even if by "red" and ''green" we mean not specific shades but broad classes of such shades.
One more remark before closing the informal part of our argument: the rule of usage described above does not, of course, determine what any particular speaker shall mean by "that shade of red" or "that shade of green" in any particular context; or even what he shall mean by the broader terms "red," "green," and "indistinguishable." Speaking scientifically rather than epistemologically (e.g., in terms of what physiology might disclose) I think it not impossible that someone's spectrum might be reversed, i.e., he might see blue where I see red and vice versa. Nevertheless, he would use the color terms "correctly" enough by ordinary standards, i.e., in conformity with such rules as that given above. This acknowledges what was sound in structuralism, as the doctrine was called which held that we can communicate the structure of our experience but not its felt quality.2 Now for the formal part of the argument. What I propose to do is to re-present the core of the foregoing informal argument as a sketch for the building up of the color concepts within a constructive system or formal language. Since this method of representing and consolidating a philosophic position is currently out of fashion, it seems desirable to begin with a remark explaining my reasons for preferring it.
Briefly, it appears to me that the most important disagreement among "analysts" today is between those who believe that there is a correct answer to such a question as the one we have been discussing, whether this is to be obtained by therapeutically dissolving the puzzle through the examination of usages, or through "straightforward analysis" of the problem; and those who feel, as I do, that there is never one final anwser, but a variety of different answers based on different explications of the crucial concepts. On this latter view, a philosophic analysis merely presents one out of many possible reconstructions of a group of concepts; the aim of the analysis is to develop the theory of these concepts; and anyone who feels that his meaning for the concepts has not been clarified is invited to develop his own explication, and to discover how an alternative interpretation of the concepts would affect the theory.
In particular, what we have done informally in the preceding pages is to sketch a reconstruction of the color concepts, and to show how this reconstruction would affect the interpretation of some philosophically puzzling sentences. This reconstruction is certainly not the only possible one; it does, however, correspond fairly well to certain rules of English usage (that have been pointed out) and to what arefor me the intuitive meanings of the concepts involved. Still, it seems important to point out that what has been presented is a reconstruction and not an attempted description of ordinary English usage. For this reason, the analysis will now be presented explicitly in constructional form.
The underlying theme of the construction is this: when we think of the color concepts, the most striking fact we observe is that they form a continuum. Likewise with the sounds, etc. This fact enables us to classify a new color we may never have encountered before as a color; it fits into one continuum but not into the other.
But to say that qualities form a continuum is to say that we can pass by imperceptible stages from one to the other; in the case of colors this "passing by imperceptible stages" is done by means of the relation of indistinguishability with respect to color. Thus this relation seems to "constitute" the color-continuum; and it is this relation (which will be symbolized as "Ind") which is taken as primitive.
Into our construction we shall wish to introduce names for specific shades, say F and G. The general method for doing this has already been indicated; we define a specific shade as the color of some object (physical or phenomenal, depending on which form of language we have chosen). Intuitively, it does seem that whenever we speak or think of "that specific shade" we have some "object in mind"-there is no other way to "pin down" the shade. But this is merely an informal comment by way of supporting the following definition patterns: (I3) "F(x)" for "Ex(x,A)" "G(x)" for "Ex(x,B,) " etc. We can also define the general notion of a color: (I4) "Col(F)" for "(vy) (x) [F(x) _ Ex(xv)],' but both of these definitions presuppose that we have already succeeded in defining "exactly the same color as" or "Ex." It is also clear from the informal part of the analysis that it is on our ability to frame a definition for this concept that our construction stands or falls. Fortunately, a definition appears to be possible: "x is exactly the same color as y" for "(for every z) z is indistinguishable in color from x if and only if z is indistinguishable in color from y."
This last proposal requires a little informal buttressing. The idea of the definition is suggested by this consideration: if A and B are not exactly the same color, then even if they are indistinguishable, something almost on the theoretical "threshold of distinguishability" with respect to A should be (in certain cases) indistinguishable from A but distinguishable from B. On the other hand, if A and B are exactly the same color, then anything that is indistinguishable from A must also be indistinguishable from B.
2I3
A somewhat more serious argument for the proposal is this: consider the conditions under which we would say that two objects are exactly the same color. These do not always coincide with the conditions under which we would say that they are indistinguishable, e.g., let A and B be indistinguishable, but suppose that C is indistinguishable from B but distinguishable from A. Then we would say that the color of B is between that of A and that of C (not that it is exactly the same color as A or C) . In other words, that everything that is indistinguishable from A be indistinguishable from B (and vice versa) is a necessary condition for A and B being exactly the same color. But is it not also a sufficient condition? If A and B are not merely indistinguishable, but if in addition everything that is indistinguishable from A is also indistinguishable from B and vice versa,-then what possible further evidence could prove that A and B are not "really" the same color?
The most important consideration, however, is that the suggested definition satisfies the criteria of adequacy (I and II) that were put down before. These conditions formulate the intuitive properties of "Ex" (and I hasten to assure the suspicious reader that they were honestly laid down in advance of finding a definition, as bona fide criteria of adequacy must be); thus any definition which satisfies them must be considered as formulating an admissible concept of "exactly the same color."
If we are using a physicalistic language, then stronger concepts could, of course, be formulated. Thus the meaning of the expression "exactly the same color" might be specified in terms of performable laboratory operations, e.g., by means of reduction sentences. Another good method would be to construe this concept as a theoretical concept, to be implicitly defined by means of theoretical postulates (which would ultimately have to be interpreted, at least partially, in terms of "laboratory operations," or other observables). But a concept so introduced would presumably be even stronger than the one we have defined, for laboratory techniques would make possible even finer distinctions than are possible on the basis of unaugmented human ability to distinguish. Thus, such concepts would also satisfy our criteria of adequacy; which is all that is necessary for the present argument. We are now in full possession of the results of the informal discussion. Thus, we have as a consequence of (I5) (proofs will be omitted) the equivalence of (i o) and (i i); to say "Nothing is the same color as this and simultaneously the same color as that" is merely to assert that "this is not the same color as that." Also, we have: , which means, as was remarked, that the "apodictic" assertion that "Nothing is the same color as this and the same color as that at the same time" (we have confined the discussion to uniformly colored objects, for the sake of simplicity) is a weaker statement than the mere "protocol," "this is distinguishable in color from that."
In closing, I should like to sketch the continuation of the construction. The next step would be to define the second-level predicates "Red(F)" (for "F is a shade of red") and "Grn(F)" (for "F is a shade of green"). In defining these predicates we are restricted by two postulates. The first formulates a feature of English usage pointed out in the informal discussion: Nothing It should be observed that these postulates define the logical structure of the color continuum, but not the actual location of the cutting points (or which end is red). Thus, anyone who uses this formal language according to the rules (of course it is not actually a language, but merely a sketch of a language) would mean by "red" a continuous series of shades, and by "orange" and "yellow," other continuous series of shades (and by "orange" all the shades between "red" and "yellow"); but the rules do not determine beyond this which shades he would mean. The relation to natural language should be clear: the rules of natural language also determine that all the shades between red and yellow shall 4E.g., Carnap, op. cit., and Goodman, op. cit. 2i6 be classified as orange; but they do not determine such a thing
